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PROPERTY OF THE LATE COMTE LOUIS DE CHASTELLUX
Washington, George (1732-1799). Autograph letter signed (“Go:Washington”) as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, to François-Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chastellux, New Windsor, 13 June 1781.
Details
Washington, George (1732-1799). Autograph letter signed (“Go:Washington”) as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, to François-Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chastellux, New Windsor, 13 June 1781.
Three pages, 229 x 189mm, bifolium, blindstamped "ARCHIVES DE CHASTELLUX" at top right, (a few toned spots).
Prelude to Yorktown: preparations for the decisive French and American collaboration. An important letter documenting some of the inevitable misunderstandings that occurred between the French and American armies during their joint campaign against the British, written at a pivotal moment as Washington and his French allies prepared for operations against New York City that would, in the end, result in their epochal march to Virginia, in a bold bid to entrap Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown. General Rochambeau, commanding 4,000 French troops, had established his headquarters in Newport, Rhode Island, ready for joint action. On 22 May 1781 Washington and Rochambeau met at Wethersfield, Connecticut to plan the forthcoming campaign, which centered upon operations against New York City as a means to relieve pressure on Lafayette's small army fighting Cornwallis in Virginia. Part of the plan agreed to at conference was that the French fleet in Newport would sail to Boston where it could be better protected once the French Army left the town on its march to link up with Washington's Continentals on the Hudson River. Soon after his arrival back at Camp, the Duc de Lauzun, the French cavalry commander, came riding in with the news that after a French council of war, held on 31 May at Newport, it had been decided that the French fleet would remain in Newport. According to Lauzun, Washington became so enraged, he was unable to pen a reply for three days (Flexner, vol. 2: p. 431). On 4 June Washington wrote to Rochambeau to voice his belief that the French fleet remaining in Newport would require more troops to remain in that place to guard it, expressing the same sentiments to Admiral Barras the same day (Fitzpatrick, vol. 22, pp. 156-159). In a private letter to Chastellux, Washington expressed his fear that if the French fleet remained at Newport, "every mysterious preparation of the enemy" would pressure the French admiral to call upon additional militia, further draining resources from the main object. On 9 September Chastellux wrote to Washington, offering reassurances that his concerns were being taken seriously by the French command. In response, the Commander-in-Chief expresses concern that he may have misconstrued his allies’ plans. After reviewing the result of the conference, Washington realized that he may have been too cautious in ensuring the safety of the French fleet, as long as it had the force required “and did not impede the march of the Army towards the Hudson.” Washington wrote in response:
“I fear from the purport of the letter you did me the honor to write from Newport, on the 9th, that my sentiments respecting the Council of War held on board the Duke de Borgoyne (the 31st of May) have been misconceived; and I shall be very unhappy if they receive an interpretation different from the true intent & meaning of them. — If this is the case, it can only be attributed to my not understanding the business of the Duke de Lauzen perfectly. – I will rely therefore on your goodness & candor to explain, & rectify the mistake, if any has happened. My wishes, perfectly coincided with the determination of the Board of War to continue the Fleet at Rhode Island - provided it could remain there in safety and with the force required; and did not impede the march of the Army towards the North River; but when Duke Lauzen informed me, that my opinion of the propriety, and safety of this measure was required by the Board,; and that he came hither at the particular request of the Counts Rochambeau and de Barras, to obtain it.; I was reduced to the painful necessity of delivering a sentiment different from that of a most respectable board, or of forfeiting all pretensions to candor by the concealment of it. — Upon this ground it was, I wrote to the Generals to the effect I did, and not because I was dissatisfied at the alteration of the plan agreed to at Wethersfield. — My fears for the safety of the Fleet, – which I am now perswaded were carried too far, – were productive of a belief that the Generals, when separated, might feel uneasy at every misterious preparation of the enemy, and occasion a fresh call for Militia; – this had some weight in my determination to give Boston (where I was sure no danger could be encountered but that of a Blockade) a preference to Newport, where, under some circumstances, though not under such as were likely to happen, something might be enterprized. –
"The Fleet being at Rhode Island is attended, certainly, with many advantages in the operations proposed – and I entreat that you, and the Gentlemen who were of opinion that it ought to be risqued there for these purposes will be assured, that I have a high sense of the obligation you meant to confer on America by that resolve – and that your Zeal to promote the common cause, & and my anxiety for the safety of so valuable a fleet, were the only motives which gave birth to the apparent difference were in our opinions. — I set that value upon your friendship and candor, – and have that implicit belief in your attachment to America, that they are only to be equaled by the sincerity with which I have the honor. to be.”
When the focus of the campaign turned from New York City to trapping Cornwallis at Yorktown later that summer, it would be Barras's fleet that would deliver the siege artillery to Chesapeake Bay. Published from the letter book copy in Fitzpatrick, Writings, vol. 22, pp. 204-205. Provenance: François-Jean de Beauvoir, Marquis de Chastellux (1734-1788) – by descent to the consignor.
Three pages, 229 x 189mm, bifolium, blindstamped "ARCHIVES DE CHASTELLUX" at top right, (a few toned spots).
Prelude to Yorktown: preparations for the decisive French and American collaboration. An important letter documenting some of the inevitable misunderstandings that occurred between the French and American armies during their joint campaign against the British, written at a pivotal moment as Washington and his French allies prepared for operations against New York City that would, in the end, result in their epochal march to Virginia, in a bold bid to entrap Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown. General Rochambeau, commanding 4,000 French troops, had established his headquarters in Newport, Rhode Island, ready for joint action. On 22 May 1781 Washington and Rochambeau met at Wethersfield, Connecticut to plan the forthcoming campaign, which centered upon operations against New York City as a means to relieve pressure on Lafayette's small army fighting Cornwallis in Virginia. Part of the plan agreed to at conference was that the French fleet in Newport would sail to Boston where it could be better protected once the French Army left the town on its march to link up with Washington's Continentals on the Hudson River. Soon after his arrival back at Camp, the Duc de Lauzun, the French cavalry commander, came riding in with the news that after a French council of war, held on 31 May at Newport, it had been decided that the French fleet would remain in Newport. According to Lauzun, Washington became so enraged, he was unable to pen a reply for three days (Flexner, vol. 2: p. 431). On 4 June Washington wrote to Rochambeau to voice his belief that the French fleet remaining in Newport would require more troops to remain in that place to guard it, expressing the same sentiments to Admiral Barras the same day (Fitzpatrick, vol. 22, pp. 156-159). In a private letter to Chastellux, Washington expressed his fear that if the French fleet remained at Newport, "every mysterious preparation of the enemy" would pressure the French admiral to call upon additional militia, further draining resources from the main object. On 9 September Chastellux wrote to Washington, offering reassurances that his concerns were being taken seriously by the French command. In response, the Commander-in-Chief expresses concern that he may have misconstrued his allies’ plans. After reviewing the result of the conference, Washington realized that he may have been too cautious in ensuring the safety of the French fleet, as long as it had the force required “and did not impede the march of the Army towards the Hudson.” Washington wrote in response:
“I fear from the purport of the letter you did me the honor to write from Newport, on the 9th, that my sentiments respecting the Council of War held on board the Duke de Borgoyne (the 31st of May) have been misconceived; and I shall be very unhappy if they receive an interpretation different from the true intent & meaning of them. — If this is the case, it can only be attributed to my not understanding the business of the Duke de Lauzen perfectly. – I will rely therefore on your goodness & candor to explain, & rectify the mistake, if any has happened. My wishes, perfectly coincided with the determination of the Board of War to continue the Fleet at Rhode Island - provided it could remain there in safety and with the force required; and did not impede the march of the Army towards the North River; but when Duke Lauzen informed me, that my opinion of the propriety, and safety of this measure was required by the Board,; and that he came hither at the particular request of the Counts Rochambeau and de Barras, to obtain it.; I was reduced to the painful necessity of delivering a sentiment different from that of a most respectable board, or of forfeiting all pretensions to candor by the concealment of it. — Upon this ground it was, I wrote to the Generals to the effect I did, and not because I was dissatisfied at the alteration of the plan agreed to at Wethersfield. — My fears for the safety of the Fleet, – which I am now perswaded were carried too far, – were productive of a belief that the Generals, when separated, might feel uneasy at every misterious preparation of the enemy, and occasion a fresh call for Militia; – this had some weight in my determination to give Boston (where I was sure no danger could be encountered but that of a Blockade) a preference to Newport, where, under some circumstances, though not under such as were likely to happen, something might be enterprized. –
"The Fleet being at Rhode Island is attended, certainly, with many advantages in the operations proposed – and I entreat that you, and the Gentlemen who were of opinion that it ought to be risqued there for these purposes will be assured, that I have a high sense of the obligation you meant to confer on America by that resolve – and that your Zeal to promote the common cause, & and my anxiety for the safety of so valuable a fleet, were the only motives which gave birth to the apparent difference were in our opinions. — I set that value upon your friendship and candor, – and have that implicit belief in your attachment to America, that they are only to be equaled by the sincerity with which I have the honor. to be.”
When the focus of the campaign turned from New York City to trapping Cornwallis at Yorktown later that summer, it would be Barras's fleet that would deliver the siege artillery to Chesapeake Bay. Published from the letter book copy in Fitzpatrick, Writings, vol. 22, pp. 204-205. Provenance: François-Jean de Beauvoir, Marquis de Chastellux (1734-1788) – by descent to the consignor.