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PROPERTY OF THE LATE COMTE LOUIS DE CHASTELLUX
LAFAYETTE, Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de (1757-1834). Autograph letter signed ("Lafayette") to François-Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chastellux, "Camp 20 milles de Williamsburg, 2 July 1781.
Details
LAFAYETTE, Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de (1757-1834). Autograph letter signed ("Lafayette") to François-Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chastellux, "Camp 20 milles de Williamsburg, 2 July 1781.
In French, six pages, 206 x 165mm, bifolium and a single sheet, blindstamped "ARCHIVES DE CHASTELLUX" at top of first and fifth pages (light foxing).
In the days before the Battle of Green Spring, Lafayette admits to his cousin, "my pride makes me tremble at the thought of losing a battle ... I have certainly made mistakes, probably more than I know, what is very clear to me is that becoming the commander in chief has changed by character." A marvelous and lengthy letter from Lafayette, then in the tidewater of Virginia shadowing the movements of a larger British force under Lord Cornwallis. Washington had sent Lafayette south in early 1781 to counter an expedition led by the now British General Benedict Arnold. Arnold's force of 1,600, who raided Richmond in January was soon reinforced by another 2,000 British regulars under William Phillips. Lafayette, desperate to protect Virginia's capital (then siting at Charlottesville for safety) and valuable military stores, divided his force--a decision he surely regretted with a large army under Lord Cornwallis arrived in Virginia from North Carolina in May. With over 7,500 British troops in Virginia, Lafayette's tiny force struggled to keep clear of Cornwallis while attempting to keep him from devastating the interior of Virginia.
Lafayette offers a vivid picture of the mounting difficulties he faced that summer, observing to his cousin, "we are opposite the talents and abilities of the undefeated Lord Cornwallis," and continually tormented by Simcoe and Tarleton. He updates Chastellux on movements in Virginia over the past several months: "My Lord's [Cornwallis] first plan was to cross the James River above me, the second was to pass below at Westover; there are fine positions in Richmond; but the left was open and once taken, there would be no way of retreat. Lord Cornwallis was preparing himself to make the most of the circumstances, and in order to prevent him from doing so, we took position at the fork created by the Chickahominy River, the enemy took position at Bottom's Bridge in Hanover Town at the fork of the North Anna River. We brushed up against each other, While preserving the high ground. while changing terrain, marching during the night, we avoided an action he desperately wanted to occur. His intension was surely to go to Petersburg, and to cut us off with everything he had in the north. The proof of this was that a letter was intercepted, by a marine captain that had been sent from Portsmouth in Rappahannock River to establish communications."
He gives an account of Tarleton's raid on Charlottesville, which nearly resulted in the capture of Governor Thomas Jefferson and the assembly: "I took position at Mattapony Church which would have been on the flank of Cornwallis in case he had continued to march. We had some stores at Point of Forks and took considerable stores from Albemarle Court House; the Baron Steuben was at Point of Forks with 500 regulars New Levies and corps of militia. Lord Cornwallis had advanced up to Cook's[?] ford, and detached Tarleton with 300 mounted men and Simcoe with 400. One for Charlottesville and the other for the Point of Forks. It was pure chance that we had knowledge of this movement and by warning the assembly and the Baron [von Steuben] first had the chance to [escape] and the Tarleton's plan failed. The Baron crossed the river with what he had and that night began a march of 80 miles with 25 deserting. The cry against the Baron was general. The assembly asked me to speak against the behavior of the officers at Point of Fork but I am only speaking with you about this matter. Particularly because what was lost was almost entirely recovered. At the same time Lord Cornwallis was marching on point of fork, and proposed to destroy all of our stores at Albemarle Court House." Since Lafayette had decided to march north in an effort to contain the main army under Cornwallis, he complained that he "received all the blame of having abandoned the stores and the [loss of] communication with General Greene; but on the other hand I sensed that even being ahead of Albemarle, I could not stop the enemy from entering. and that's 800 men would not stop 4,000; I decided then to await the Pennsylvanians, about who's arrival I had been often misinformed."
Lafayette confided that it often appeared that Cornwallis was "playing a trick on me. He seems to be aware of every detachment that I move to attack him, I've surmised that the only for things to be calm in my camp is to pay great attention to the most minute details. You see my dear Chevalier, that I chit chat like an able man, but since I have taken my command I have become accustomed to see the others of my opinion and that gives me trenchant airs. I hope that this will not end with me cutting off my own ears."
Several days later, at Green Spring, south of Williamsburg, Lafayette what have a chance to meet Cornwallis in battle. True to his suspicions, Cornwallis did play a trick on the young French general: as he prepared to cross the James river toward the south shore, he made it appear that most of his army had crossed, leaving only the rear guard. In fact most of his army remained on the north shore. Anthony Wayne, commanding the Pennsylvanians that Layfette mentions in the present letter, took the brunt of Cornwallis's attack, but after a sharp engagement, managed to retreat in good order, saving Lafayette's army from a disastrous defeat.
In French, six pages, 206 x 165mm, bifolium and a single sheet, blindstamped "ARCHIVES DE CHASTELLUX" at top of first and fifth pages (light foxing).
In the days before the Battle of Green Spring, Lafayette admits to his cousin, "my pride makes me tremble at the thought of losing a battle ... I have certainly made mistakes, probably more than I know, what is very clear to me is that becoming the commander in chief has changed by character." A marvelous and lengthy letter from Lafayette, then in the tidewater of Virginia shadowing the movements of a larger British force under Lord Cornwallis. Washington had sent Lafayette south in early 1781 to counter an expedition led by the now British General Benedict Arnold. Arnold's force of 1,600, who raided Richmond in January was soon reinforced by another 2,000 British regulars under William Phillips. Lafayette, desperate to protect Virginia's capital (then siting at Charlottesville for safety) and valuable military stores, divided his force--a decision he surely regretted with a large army under Lord Cornwallis arrived in Virginia from North Carolina in May. With over 7,500 British troops in Virginia, Lafayette's tiny force struggled to keep clear of Cornwallis while attempting to keep him from devastating the interior of Virginia.
Lafayette offers a vivid picture of the mounting difficulties he faced that summer, observing to his cousin, "we are opposite the talents and abilities of the undefeated Lord Cornwallis," and continually tormented by Simcoe and Tarleton. He updates Chastellux on movements in Virginia over the past several months: "My Lord's [Cornwallis] first plan was to cross the James River above me, the second was to pass below at Westover; there are fine positions in Richmond; but the left was open and once taken, there would be no way of retreat. Lord Cornwallis was preparing himself to make the most of the circumstances, and in order to prevent him from doing so, we took position at the fork created by the Chickahominy River, the enemy took position at Bottom's Bridge in Hanover Town at the fork of the North Anna River. We brushed up against each other, While preserving the high ground. while changing terrain, marching during the night, we avoided an action he desperately wanted to occur. His intension was surely to go to Petersburg, and to cut us off with everything he had in the north. The proof of this was that a letter was intercepted, by a marine captain that had been sent from Portsmouth in Rappahannock River to establish communications."
He gives an account of Tarleton's raid on Charlottesville, which nearly resulted in the capture of Governor Thomas Jefferson and the assembly: "I took position at Mattapony Church which would have been on the flank of Cornwallis in case he had continued to march. We had some stores at Point of Forks and took considerable stores from Albemarle Court House; the Baron Steuben was at Point of Forks with 500 regulars New Levies and corps of militia. Lord Cornwallis had advanced up to Cook's[?] ford, and detached Tarleton with 300 mounted men and Simcoe with 400. One for Charlottesville and the other for the Point of Forks. It was pure chance that we had knowledge of this movement and by warning the assembly and the Baron [von Steuben] first had the chance to [escape] and the Tarleton's plan failed. The Baron crossed the river with what he had and that night began a march of 80 miles with 25 deserting. The cry against the Baron was general. The assembly asked me to speak against the behavior of the officers at Point of Fork but I am only speaking with you about this matter. Particularly because what was lost was almost entirely recovered. At the same time Lord Cornwallis was marching on point of fork, and proposed to destroy all of our stores at Albemarle Court House." Since Lafayette had decided to march north in an effort to contain the main army under Cornwallis, he complained that he "received all the blame of having abandoned the stores and the [loss of] communication with General Greene; but on the other hand I sensed that even being ahead of Albemarle, I could not stop the enemy from entering. and that's 800 men would not stop 4,000; I decided then to await the Pennsylvanians, about who's arrival I had been often misinformed."
Lafayette confided that it often appeared that Cornwallis was "playing a trick on me. He seems to be aware of every detachment that I move to attack him, I've surmised that the only for things to be calm in my camp is to pay great attention to the most minute details. You see my dear Chevalier, that I chit chat like an able man, but since I have taken my command I have become accustomed to see the others of my opinion and that gives me trenchant airs. I hope that this will not end with me cutting off my own ears."
Several days later, at Green Spring, south of Williamsburg, Lafayette what have a chance to meet Cornwallis in battle. True to his suspicions, Cornwallis did play a trick on the young French general: as he prepared to cross the James river toward the south shore, he made it appear that most of his army had crossed, leaving only the rear guard. In fact most of his army remained on the north shore. Anthony Wayne, commanding the Pennsylvanians that Layfette mentions in the present letter, took the brunt of Cornwallis's attack, but after a sharp engagement, managed to retreat in good order, saving Lafayette's army from a disastrous defeat.